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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Minnesota Statutes 
section 82.21, subdivision 2 displaces the common law procuring 
cause doctrine in disputes over real estate broker commissions.1  In 
spite of recent precedent asserting the statute’s abrogation of the 
common law,2 the supreme court in Rosenberg held that Minnesota 
real estate brokers can rely on the procuring cause doctrine as an 
alternative remedy in cases involving commission disputes.3 
This note first examines some useful history and terminology 
regarding real estate commission disputes, the procuring cause 
doctrine, and Minnesota Statutes section 82.21.4  It follows with a 
summary of the facts of the Rosenberg decision and the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ and Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
case.5  This note then analyzes the supreme court’s decision to 
apply the procuring cause doctrine in Rosenberg,6 and concludes 
with a plea to the Minnesota legislature to clarify that the effect of 
the statute is to abrogate that doctrine.7 
II. HISTORY AND TERMINOLOGY 
A. Brokers, Listing Agreements, and Commission Disputes 
 
1. Brokers and Listing Agreements 
 
Minnesota law defines a real estate broker as a person who “for 
another and for commission, fee, or other valuable consideration . . . 
lists, sells, exchanges, buys or rents, manages, or offers or attempts 
 
 1. See Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 
2004) [hereinafter Rosenberg II]. 
 2. See Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 3. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 326-30. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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to negotiate a sale . . . purchase or rental of an interest or estate in 
real estate.”8  Because of the complexities involved in many real 
estate transactions, the involvement of a broker is often crucial.9  In 
a typical real estate sale, the broker commonly handles many 
aspects of the selling process such as setting the correct price, 
developing a marketing plan to attract potential buyers, negotiating 
the eventual sale, and performing some, or all, of the final closing 
duties.10  Real estate brokers enter into contracts with their clients 
 
 8. MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 18(a) (2004) (emphasis added).  Minnesota 
Statutes section 82.17 recognizes various other ways in which a person can be 
considered a broker including, for example, advertising as a broker, securing 
loans in connection with mortgages, and selling business-related property.  Id. § 
82.17, subd. 18(a), (b), (d)-(f).  In contrast, the statute distinguishes a “real estate 
salesperson” as “one who acts on behalf of a real estate broker in performing any 
act authorized . . . to be performed by the broker.”  Id. § 82.17, subd. 19. 
 9. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF REALTORS PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS AND SELLERS: MINNESOTA STATE REPORT 2, 
available at http://www.mnrealtor.com/publications/surveys.html.  In promoting 
the importance of hiring a real estate broker, the National Association of Realtors 
states, 
In today’s market, many people mistakenly believe that selling a house is 
uncomplicated and effortless.  However, selling one’s home can often be 
even more daunting than buying a home.  Establishing a competitive list 
price, deciding how to market a home, and timing the sale to coincide 
with a purchase of another home are all challenging but important 
undertakings that the home seller must manage. 
Real estate professionals specialize in assisting buyers and sellers with 
these tasks and are knowledgeable in all aspects of the home sales 
transaction. They have the experience and expertise to coordinate all 
parts of the sales transaction for both buyers and sellers. It is therefore no 
surprise that the majority of home sales involve a real estate professional 
in some capacity. 
Real estate professionals know their neighborhoods better than anyone. 
With this knowledge, they help their clients find properties that meet the 
needs of first-time buyers, married couples with children, or empty-
nesters looking to downsize. Additionally, they also assist sellers in 
pricing, marketing and selling their homes in a timely manner. 
Id. 
 10. See MoneySense.ca, What a REALTOR Can Do for You That You Can’t Do for 
Yourself, at http://www.moneysense.ca/spending/home_mortgage/article.jsp? 
content=20030429_135512_4576 (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).  According to a 
recent survey conducted by the Minnesota Association of Realtors, “the most 
important tasks that sellers wanted their agent to perform were help selling the 
house within the seller’s time frame (26 percent), help pricing the home 
competitively (25 percent) and help finding a buyer (19 percent).”  MINNESOTA 
ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Real Estate Industry Scan: Trends, Industry Practice, 
Innovation & Change 10, available at http://www.mnrealtor.com/publications/ 
pdfs/Industry04.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate Industry 
Scan]. 
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through written listing agreements.11 
A listing agreement is “an agreement between a property 
owner and [a broker], whereby the [broker] agrees to try to secure 
a buyer . . . for a specific property at a certain price and terms in 
return for a fee or commission.”12  A typical listing agreement 
includes, at minimum, the names of the parties to the contract, a 
description of the property for sale, the sales price and terms of 
payment, the amount of compensation, and a termination date.13  
Generally, by entering into a listing agreement with a property 
owner, a real estate broker agrees to find a buyer who is ready, 
willing, and able to purchase the owner’s property at the price 
specified in the contract and under any other terms contained in 
the agreement.14  In practice, however, a broker’s commission is 
earned only when the broker “has performed all that he undertook 
to perform” according to the listing agreement.15  This 
performance is specifically defined by the exact terms negotiated 
 
 11. “In more than half the states, particular provisions of the statute of frauds 
or of state licensing or administrative rules or regulations . . . either require a 
broker’s employment contract to be in writing or require a written agreement in 
order to collect a commission.”  15 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 
§ 84C.03[3] (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2004).  Although there is no explicit statute 
of frauds requirement for listing agreements in Minnesota, “all listing agreements 
must be in writing . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (2004).  In addition, 
Minnesota Statutes address the subject, stating, “No person required by this 
chapter to be licensed shall be entitled to or may bring or maintain any action in 
the courts for any commission, fee or other compensation with respect to . . . real 
property unless there is a written agreement with the person required to be 
licensed.”  MINN. STAT. § 82.18, subd. 2. 
 12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (7th ed. 1999).  Most commonly, a listing 
agreement in Minnesota is an “exclusive right to sell agreement,” under which the 
broker receives a commission regardless of whether the broker actually makes the 
sale.  EILEEN ROBERTS, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: REAL ESTATE LAW § 1.10 (2004).  
Two other less common types of listing agreements are the “open listing 
agreement” and the “net listing agreement.”  In an open listing agreement, or 
nonexclusive listing agreement, any broker who finds a buyer for the property 
owner is entitled to a commission.  Id.  In a net listing agreement, the broker’s 
commission is only “the amount . . . by which the actual purchase price for the 
listed property exceeds the price that the seller specified in the listing agreement.”  
Id. 
 13. POWELL, supra note 11, § 84C.03[2][a]. 
 14. Lohman v. Edgewater Holding Co., 227 Minn. 40, 44, 33 N.W.2d 842, 844-
45 (1948) (“In the absence of a contrary agreement a broker to sell realty is 
entitled to his commission when he produces a purchaser ready, willing, and able, 
to purchase the property . . . .”); see also John M. Norwood & Cornelius J. Hyde, 
Extension Clauses in Louisiana Listing Agreements, 42 LA. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1982). 
 15. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 
510, 253 N.W.2d 133, 141 (1977)). 
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between the broker and the seller.16  The concept is relatively 
simple: if the broker delivers a buyer to the property owner 
according to the terms specified in the listing agreement, the 
broker is entitled to a commission.  However, this seemingly simple 
concept does not always produce the desired results.  Because the 
typical commission paid to the seller’s broker in a real estate 
transaction can range anywhere from five to seven percent of the 
sales price of the property,17 brokers can earn, and sellers can pay, 
large amounts of money for commissions.18  As a result, commission 
disputes are not uncommon. 
2. Commission Disputes 
Disputes between real estate brokers and sellers regarding 
whether a commission has been earned can take various forms and 
arise for any number of reasons.  In one situation, multiple brokers 
are involved in a sale and more than one of those brokers claim to 
be responsible for that sale.19  A second type of problem occurs 
upon the prospective sale of property to a buyer, which later fails to 
close for any number of reasons.20 
 
 16. Id. (citing Olson v. Penkert, 252 Minn. 334, 342, 90 N.W.2d 193, 200 
(1958)). 
 17. GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 49 (4th ed. 2003).  In 
response to antitrust price fixing allegations by the U.S. Supreme Court, listing 
agreement forms currently “invite sellers to negotiate the amount of the 
commission” by leaving the exact amount of the commission out of blank forms.  
Id. at 50. 
 18. For example, according to a recent survey by the Minnesota Association 
of Realtors, “[t]he typical home seller [in 2003] sold their home for $190,000 and 
then purchased a home for $195,000.”  Real Estate Industry Scan, supra note 10, at 
10.  Assuming an average commission of six percent and a home selling for 
$190,000, the real estate broker who both lists and sells a typical Minnesota home 
would earn a commission of $11,400. 
 19. WERNER & KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 111-12 (10th ed. 1993). 
When several brokers are involved . . . [i]f the first broker’s efforts result 
in a disagreement or if negotiations are abandoned, and thereafter a 
second broker steps in and brings the parties together, the second broker 
is the procuring cause of the sale.  But if the first broker brings about a 
substantial agreement and the second broker merely works out details of 
the transaction, the first broker is the procuring cause of the sale. 
Id.  See, e.g., Rees-Thomson-Scroggins, Inc. v. Nelson, 276 Minn. 453, 150 N.W.2d 
568 (1967); Neumeier v. Sperzel, 223 Minn. 60, 25 N.W.2d 651 (1946); Dorgeloh 
v. Mark, 183 Minn. 265, 236 N.W. 325 (1931). 
 20. POWELL, supra note 11, § 84C.04[1] (“Where the broker has found a 
ready, willing and able buyer, the seller generally cannot defeat the broker’s right 
to a commission by failing to consummate the transaction, for example, by 
refusing to convey, or by being unable to convey because of lack of clear title.”).  
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Although both of the above types of commission disputes have 
produced interesting and important case law, this note focuses 
specifically on post-termination commission disputes.  These 
disputes generally involve the sale of property by the owner or 
through a second broker after the termination or expiration of the 
original listing agreement.21  To resolve commission disputes, 
Minnesota courts have applied the procuring cause doctrine. 
 
B. The Procuring Cause Doctrine 
 
1. The Doctrine in General 
 
Under the procuring cause doctrine, a broker is entitled to a 
commission if that broker’s efforts are “the efficient cause, but not 
necessarily the sole cause of a series of unbroken, continuous 
events, which culminate in the accomplishment of the objective of 
the employment.”22  This equitable doctrine is based on the 
common law doctrine of quantum meruit23 in that it allows the real 
estate broker to prove that the seller has obtained the benefit of 
the broker’s services, typically in the form of a sale of property, 
without paying for those services.24  To succeed under the 
procuring cause doctrine, the broker must provide evidence “that 
[the broker] originated a course of events which without a break in 
their continuity created a cause of which the sale was the result.”25  
The broker must prove that his efforts did more than just 
 
See, e.g., Lake Co. v. Molan, 269 Minn. 490, 497, 131 N.W.2d 734, 739 (1964). 
 21. Steven K. Mulliken, When Does the Seller Owe the Broker a Commission?  A 
Discussion of the Law and What It Teaches about Listing Agreements, 132 MIL. L. REV. 
265, 280 (1991).  See, e.g., Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004); Spring Co. v. 
Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 78 N.W.2d 315 (1956); Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm 460 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1990); Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
 22. 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 62:19 (4th ed. 1990).  
The procuring cause doctrine is commonly used by the broker to “show that his or 
her part of the contract was performed,” or as a defense by the property owner to 
prevent fraud on the part of the broker.  12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 236 (2004). 
 23. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1013.  Quantum meruit is “the 
reasonable value of services; damages awarded in an amount considered 
reasonable to compensate a person who has rendered services in a quasi-
contractual relationship.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1255. 
 24. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011. 
 25. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 
51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1956)). 
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“contribute to the result,” but were the means that actually 
produced the sale.26  Accordingly, the question of who was the 
procuring cause of a sale varies with the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case.27  The procuring cause doctrine has 
been applied by Minnesota courts in situations involving brokerage 
commission disputes for more than a century.28 
2. The Procuring Cause Doctrine in Minnesota Courts 
The procuring cause doctrine was first applied by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in an 1882 dispute over real estate 
broker commissions in Armstrong v. Wann.29  In deciding whether 
the eventual purchaser had been procured by the broker in 
Armstrong, the court set out the procuring cause doctrine: 
All that plaintiff had to do to be entitled to his 
commissions was to procure a purchaser ready and willing 
to buy upon his employer’s terms.  If he did so it would 
make no difference that the employer made the bargain 
with the purchaser.  Plaintiff, however, must have been 
the procuring cause of the sale.  It must have been the 
result of the means and efforts employed by him; must 
have proceeded from these means and efforts.30 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 237 (2004). 
 28. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 327 n.6 (noting that Minnesota has 
recognized the procuring cause doctrine for “several decades” and citing Wright v. 
M.B. Hagen Realty Co., 269 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. 1978); Stead v. Erickson, 182 
Minn. 469, 471, 234 N.W. 678, 679 (1931); Armstrong v. Wann, 29 Minn. 126, 127, 
12 N.W. 345, 346 (1882)). 
 29. 29 Minn. 126, 12 N.W. 345 (1882). 
 30. Id. at 127-28, 12 N.W. at 346 (citing Murray v. Currie, 7 Carr. & P. 584 
(1836); Wilkinson v. Martin, 8 Carr. & P. 5 (1837); Hungerford v. Hicks, 39 Conn. 
259 (1872); Gillespie v. Wilder, 99 Mass. 170 (1868); Tombs v. Alexander, 101 
Mass. 255 (1869); Earp v. Cummings, 54 Pa. St. 394 (1867); Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 
N.Y. 235 (1867); McClave v. Paine, 49 N.Y. 561 (1872); Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N.Y. 
124 (1872); Chandler v. Sutton, 5 Daily 112; Wylie v. Mar. Nat. Bank, 61 N.Y. 415 
(1875).  The specific dispute in Armstrong involved the seller’s direct sale to a 
buyer who had originally contemplated purchasing property jointly with a second 
buyer through the original broker.  Armstong, 29 Minn. at 126-27, 12 N.W. at 346.  
Applying the procuring cause doctrine, the court reasoned: 
As plaintiff made no bargain with King, and did not, in the negotiation 
he had with him and Keigher, bring him to consent to buy, and was not, 
during the four months after that negotiation ended, carrying on any 
negotiations with him, nor using any efforts with him to induce him to 
buy, he was not the procuring cause of the sale, unless it can be assumed 
that because of what occurred in the unsuccessful negotiation, King 
made defendant the offer which was accepted.  This cannot be assumed; 
7
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Since Armstrong, the procuring cause doctrine has been 
applied numerous times by Minnesota courts in cases involving real 
estate commissions.31  One case particularly relevant to disputes 
involving post-termination commissions is Spring Co. v. Holle.32  In 
Spring Co., the plaintiff/broker entered into an exclusive listing 
agreement to sell the defendant/seller’s home in exchange for a 
five percent commission.33  After showing the house to several 
potential purchasers, the broker presented two offers to the seller 
on behalf of a purchaser, both of which were rejected.34   
After the listing agreement expired, however, the seller 
executed a separate agreement to sell the property to the same 
purchaser.35  The court described the situation as follows: 
In October of 1953, without plaintiff’s knowledge, [the 
seller] communicated directly with [the purchaser] with 
respect to purchasing the property and persuaded him to 
look at it again.  This time [the seller] offered it for 
$35,000, and [the purchaser] quickly indicated his desire 
to purchase the property at that figure.  An unusual sales 
procedure was then adopted, which the trial court found 
was resorted to because of [the seller’s] belief that most 
listing contracts had provisions protecting the agents 
therein on their commissions for six months after the 
expiration date thereof.36 
After hearing of the agreement, the broker demanded 
commissions on the sale.37 
Applying the procuring cause doctrine in Spring Co., the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that, as a result of his efforts to sell 
the property and the offers presented to the seller, as well as the 
apparent collusion between the seller and the buyer to deprive the 
plaintiff of a commission, there was “ample evidence to sustain a 
finding that [the broker] was the procuring cause of the sale.”38 
 
it is not indicated by the evidence.  The fair inference is that after the 
failure of that negotiation, King, either from something subsequently 
occurring or from something occurring between him and defendant, 
concluded to buy. 
Id. at 128, 12 N.W. at 346. 
 31. See, e.g., supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
 32. 248 Minn. 51, 78 N.W.2d 315 (1956). 
 33. Id. at 53, 78 N.W.2d at 317. 
 34. Id. at 53-54, 78 N.W.2d at 317. 
 35. Id. at 54, 78 N.W.2d at 317. 
 36. Id. at 54, 78 N.W.2d at 317-18. 
 37. Id. at 55, 78 N.W.2d at 318. 
 38. Id. at 56, 78 N.W.2d at 319. 
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To help avoid disputes regarding the payment of commissions 
after the expiration of a listing agreement, real estate brokers 
commonly include contractual provisions dictating the specific 
events that will lead to a commission in the event that a sale is 
consummated after the original listing agreement is terminated or 
expires.39 
C. Override Clauses, Protective Lists, and Chapter 82 of Minnesota 
Statutes 
1. Override Clauses and Protective Lists 
 
To provide greater protection from potential conflicts 
involving the payment of commissions, many listing agreements 
contain override clauses.40  Minnesota law defines an override 
clause as “a provision in a listing agreement or similar instrument 
allowing the broker to receive compensation when, after the listing 
agreement has expired, the property is sold to persons with whom a 
broker or salesperson had negotiated or exhibited the property 
prior to the expiration of the listing agreement.”41  One reason for 
this type of provision is to protect the broker from a seller who 
refuses to accept an offer during the time period stated in the 
listing agreement, “only to accept a similar offer from the same 
buyer shortly after the period has expired.”42  Additionally, an 
override clause protects the seller by ensuring that “the broker will 
work hard to sell the property before the listing agreement 
expired.”43 
Property owners and brokers can also provide more security 
and avoid litigation by requiring a protective list along with an 
override clause.  “A protective list is a written list of names and 
addresses of prospective purchasers with whom the broker 
negotiated the sale or rental of the property or to whom the broker 
exhibited the property before the listing agreement expires.”44  A 
typical override clause containing a protective list requirement 
 
 39. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 40. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12.  Override clauses are also commonly 
referred to as extensions clauses.  See Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011. 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 12 (2004). 
 42. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011; see ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 
1.12. 
 43. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12. 
 44. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 15 (2004)). 
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might read: 
If within 180 days after the end of this contract [Seller] 
sell[s] or agree[s] to sell the property to anyone who: (1) 
During this contract made inquiry of [Broker] about the 
property and [Seller] did not tell [Broker] about the 
inquiry; or (2) During this contract made an alternative 
showing of interest in the property or was physically 
shown the property by [Broker] and whose name is on a 
written list [given to Seller by Broker] within 72 hours 
after the end of this contract, then [Seller] will pay 
[Broker] a commission on the selling price, even if 
[Seller] sells the property without [Broker’s] assistance.45 
Both override clauses and protective lists are addressed by 
Minnesota law governing real estate brokers. 
2. Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes 
Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statues regulates real estate brokers 
and salespersons and addresses such topics as compensation, 
contracts, disclosure requirements, and licensing.46  Additionally, 
Chapter 82 delegates authority to the commissioner of commerce 
to promulgate additional rules necessary for carrying out the 
statutory provisions.47  In 1982, in response to questions regarding 
the required contents of a listing agreement,48 the Commerce 
Department created a rule specifying the elements of a listing 
agreement in Minnesota.49  Originally, the requirements were set 
out in Minnesota Rules 2800.3800, which was later renumbered 
Rules 2805.1200.50  The legislature codified the rule in Statutes 
section 82.195 in 1993.51  Chapter 82 was subsequently renumbered 
in 2004, and the listing agreement requirements are currently 
located in Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2.52  For 
clarity, although many of the cases discussed in this note predate 
 
 45. Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142, 145-46 (Minn. 2000). 
 46. See MINN. STAT. ch. 82 (2004). 
 47. Id. § 82.47. 
 48. See Rueben v. Gibbs, 297 Minn. 321, 323, 210 N.W.2d 857, 858 (1973) (“It 
will be noted that the statute is part of Chapter 82, dealing with the regulation of 
real estate brokers.  Nowhere in the chapter is a listing agreement defined. 
Common sense would indicate that a listing agreement contain at least an 
authorization to sell.”). 
 49. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11. 
 50. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11 n.9. 
 51. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11. 
 52. See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (2004). 
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the codification of the listing agreement rule or the renumbering 
of Minnesota’s real estate statute, this note will refer exclusively to 
Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statues as renumbered in 2004. 
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 requires that a 
listing agreement include certain elements.53  Several of these 
elements directly address override clauses and protective lists.  
Section 82.21 subdivision 2(b)(6) requires that all listing 
agreements include: 
[I]nformation regarding an override clause, if applicable, 
including a statement to the effect that the override clause 
will not be effective unless the [broker] supplies the seller 
with a protective list within 72 hours after the expiration 
of the listing agreement.54 
Further, subdivision 2(e) of section 82.21 adds explicit 
requirements regarding the use of protective lists: 
A broker or salesperson has the burden of demonstrating 
that each person on the protective list has, during the 
period of the listing agreement, either made an 
affirmative showing of interest in the property by 
responding to an advertisement or by contacting the 
broker or salesperson involved or has been physically 
shown the property by the broker or salesperson.55 
Although the language of the statute seems relatively benign, 
there has been recent controversy with regard to whether the use 
of an override clause and protective list is required for a broker to 
receive post-termination commissions under Minnesota law, and 
further, whether the requirements of section 82.21 were intended 
to abrogate the procuring cause doctrine.56  Before addressing the 
 
 53. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(1)-(10).  The specific listing agreement elements 
required by the statute are: “a definite expiration date;” “a description of the real 
property involved;” “the list price of the property;” “any terms required by the 
seller;” “the amount of any compensation or commission or the basis for 
computing the commission;” “a clear statement explaining the events [and] 
conditions that will entitle a broker to a commission;” information regarding an 
override clause (if applicable), including a statement regarding the inclusion of a 
protective list; a notice stating that compensation will be determined between the 
broker and the client; “a dual agency disclosure statement;” a notice regarding the 
seller’s approval of arrangement of closing services by the broker; and for 
residential listings, a notice regarding non-payment of commissions in the event 
that the seller engages another broker after the expiration of the initial 
agreement.  Id. 
 54. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. § 82.21, subd.2(e). 
 56. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d 320 (2004). 
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supreme court’s resolution of this issue, however, it is useful to 
examine prior case law addressing Minnesota Statutes section 
82.21, subdivision 2 and the procuring cause doctrine. 
 
D. Prior Application of Section 82.21 in Minnesota Courts 
 
1. Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora 
 
In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the 
issue of whether the requirements of section 82.21 (then 
Minnesota Rules 2800.3800) abrogate the procuring cause doctrine 
in Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora.57  In that case, the 
respondents/sellers entered into a listing agreement with the 
appellant/broker to sell lakeshore property in Duluth, Minnesota.58  
After the expiration of the agreement, the sellers enlisted a 
different real estate agent and eventually sold the home through 
that agent.59  Although the listing agreement included a standard 
override clause, the broker failed to provide a protective list.60 
In Lynn Beechler Realty, the court addressed the broker’s 
argument that the original listing agreement had been implicitly 
extended by the parties, and stated that even if the agreement had 
been extended, the “[broker] still should have given respondents a 
protective customer list within seventy-two hours of [the 
termination date].”61  More importantly, however, the court also 
addressed the broker’s argument that it was entitled to a 
commission because it was the procuring cause of the sale under 
Spring Co. v. Holle.  The court stated, “The facts in Spring Co. are 
similar to those in this case.  However, Spring Co. precedes the 
promulgation of [the listing agreement requirements], and does 
not apply.”62  As a result, the court in Lynn Beechler Realty 
determined that the override remedy provided in section 82.21, 
subdivision 2 was the exclusive remedy through which brokers 
could receive post-termination commissions and implicitly held 
that the statute abrogated the common law procuring cause 
 
 57. 396 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 58. Id. at 718. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 719.  The court referenced Minnesota Rules 2800.3800 subparts 4 
and 5 (currently Statutes section 82.21, subdivisions 2(d)(1) and 2(e)).  Id. at 719-
20. 
 62. Id. 
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doctrine in those situations. 
2. Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm 
In 1990, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again opined on the 
intended enforcement of section 82.21’s (then renumbered 
Minnesota Rules 2805.1200) listing agreement requirements in 
Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm.63  In that case, the respondents/sellers 
entered into a listing agreement with the appellant/broker to sell 
their home.64  The agreement contained a standard override clause, 
as well as an explicit reference to the seventy-two hour protective 
list requirement.65  In Realty House, the prospective buyer cancelled 
the initial purchase agreement because of costly defects discovered 
shortly after the expiration of the initial listing agreement.66  The 
sellers subsequently entered into a purchase agreement with the 
same buyer for a substantially lower price.67  Although the trial 
court held that the sellers “had a contractual obligation to pay a 
commission to [the broker] even though [the broker] failed to 
provide a protective list after the agreement expired,”68 the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. 
Relying on its interpretation in Lynn Beechler Realty, the court 
commented on the necessity of strict compliance with the override 
clause requirements: 
The burden of producing a protective list is not great.  
The realtor is familiar with real estate rules, knows when 
the listing agreement expires, has the information the 
protective list requires, and is accustomed to providing 
such lists.  Thus, even if a purchase agreement has been 
signed when the listing agreement expires, a realtor 
wishing to protect its commission should provide . . . a 
protective list.69 
Although the court of appeals did not directly address the 
procuring cause doctrine in Realty House, its holding reinforced the 
view that when a listing agreement expired, a broker could only 
recover commissions by application of an override clause and 
 
 63. 460 N.W.2d 917 (1990). 
 64. Id. at 918. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 918-19. 
 67. Id. at 919. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 920. 
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protective list. 
3. Douglas v. Schuette 
In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals even more explicitly 
addressed Minnesota Statutes section 82.21’s (then codified in 
section 82.195) displacement of the procuring cause doctrine in 
Douglas v. Schuette.70  Douglas involved the cancellation of a purchase 
agreement for 420 acres of land by a buyer who questioned the 
broker’s business practices.71  After the expiration of the listing 
agreement between the appellant/broker and the 
respondent/seller, the seller hired a new real estate agent and the 
original buyer agreed to purchase the land.72  The broker filed suit 
for commissions on the sale.73 
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that the 
broker might have been able to recover a commission subject to 
the override clause in the original listing agreement, but had not 
provided the seller with a protective list as required by Minnesota 
Statutes section 82.21.74  The court responded to the broker’s 
argument that the appellant was entitled to a commission as the 
agent who procured the eventual buyer by stating, “this court has 
held that a real estate agent cannot recover a commission by relying on 
the procuring-cause doctrine.”75 
In spite of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ strict enforcement 
of section 82.21 in Realty House and clear statements of the statute’s 
abrogation of the common law procuring cause doctrine in Lynn 
Beechler and Douglas, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded with 








 70. 607 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 71. Id. at 144. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 145-46. 
 75. Id. at 146 (citing Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717, 
720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added)). 
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In July 1997, Gary Rosenberg (Rosenberg), doing business as 
Shelter Consultants, entered into an agreement with Heritage 
Marketing, LLC (Heritage)76 involving the sale of 350 individual 
condominium units in the RiverStation development project near 
downtown Minneapolis.77  Under the agreement, Rosenberg served 
as the salesperson for the project in exchange for “commissions of 
2.5% on coop sales and 3.5% on in house sales,” as well as “a draw 
against commissions of $3,000 per month together with an advance 
of $1,500 per unit” upon the approval of each purchase 
agreement.78  The agreement provided that the balance of the 
commissions were to be paid upon closing.79  The agreement did 
not include an express termination date, but the terms stated that 
Rosenberg was “to work the model sales center hours throughout 
the time frame of the project.”80  The agreement contained no 
override or extension clause.81 
Rosenberg sold condominiums pursuant to the agreement 
with Heritage beginning in July 1997 and into February 2001.82  On 
February 14, 2001, however, Heritage informed Rosenberg that the 
contract was terminated and that he should stop selling 
condominium units on its behalf.83  As of February 14, Rosenberg 
 
 76. The developers involved in the RiverStation project in fact formed two 
corporations to complete the project: Heritage Renovations, LLC to be the owner 
and developer of the project, and Heritage Marketing, LLC to provide marketing 
and sales services to Heritage Renovations.  Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 322. 
 77. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, No. C7-03-94, 2003 WL 
21694604, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2003) (unpublished opinion) 
[hereinafter Rosenberg I]; Brief for Respondent at 6, Rosenberg v. Heritage 
Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004) (No. C7-03-94) [hereinafter 
Respondent’s Brief]. 
 78. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 323. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 323-24. 
 82. Id. at 323. 
 83. Id.  Although the court in Rosenberg II did not comment on the reason for 
the termination of the listing agreement between Rosenberg and Heritage, 
Heritage’s brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court provides some insight: 
Heritage Marketing and its prospective buyers had difficulties with 
[Rosenberg’s] abrasive personality as well as his lack of responsiveness 
and failure to staff the model condominiums.  Heritage Marketing 
received numerous complaints about [Rosenberg], including a written 
15
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claimed to have “almost 40 purchasers under contract[,] . . . 18 as 
purchase agreements and 20 as reservation agreements.”84  
Rosenberg sued Heritage Marketing,85 claiming that he was entitled 
to commissions on the sales that he procured before the agreement 
was terminated.86  On November 18, 2002, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Heritage on grounds that 
Rosenberg’s failure to include an override clause in the agreement 
precluded him from receiving post-termination commissions.87  
Rosenberg appealed.88 
B. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reconsidered the trial court’s 
determination regarding Rosenberg’s entitlement to commissions 
after his termination from the RiverStation project.89  To arrive at 
its conclusion, the court applied a straightforward application of 
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 as interpreted in Realty House, Inc. 
v. Grimm.  The court of appeals stated: 
 
complaint from a prospective buyer who accused [Rosenberg] of . . . 
“steering” in the sale of the condominiums.  When informed of the latter 
complaint, [Rosenberg] simply informed Heritage Marketing that the 
buyer’s perception was “[its] problem,” evidencing complete lack of 
“customer service” mentality. 
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 6.  Not surprisingly, Rosenberg’s brief 
described the termination very differently: 
On or about January 31, 2001, without any advance warning or any stated 
reason, [Heritage] told Rosenberg that [it] wanted Rosenberg to 
voluntarily withdraw from the RiverStation venture.  Rosenberg refused.  
On or about February 1, 2001, [Heritage] claims to have sent a facsimile 
termination letter to Rosenberg, although Rosenberg did not receive it.  
The letter cites no reasons for the termination.  The first time Rosenberg 
saw any alleged “reason” for his termination was during discovery at this 
proceeding. 
Brief for Appellant at 10, Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 
320 (Minn. 2004) (C7-03-94) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]. 
 84. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 323. 
 85. In fact, Rosenberg sued both Heritage Renovations and Heritage 
Marketing.  However, Heritage Renovations was dismissed from the suit as an 
unnecessary party because it was not named in the agreement between Rosenberg 
and Heritage Marketing.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 324. 
 89. Rosenberg I, No. C7-03-94, 2003 WL 21694604, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 
22, 2003).  The court also considered questions of whether the listing agreement 
was valid, whether it was terminable at will, and whether the agreement created a 
joint venture between Rosenberg and Heritage.  Id. at *2-3. 
16
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Recovery of commissions for sales that occur after 
termination of the listing agreement requires that the 
real-estate agent include in the listing agreement an 
override clause and, after expiration or termination of the 
agreement, that the real-estate agent provide the seller 
with a protective list.90 
Because the listing agreement between Rosenberg and 
Heritage did not contain an override provision and Rosenberg 
failed to provide a protective list within the seventy-two hour period 
prescribed by the statute, the court held that “[he] could not 
recover for any unpaid commissions that he otherwise might have 
been entitled to after [Heritage] terminated the agreement.”91  
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.92  Rosenberg appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.93 
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court handled the disputed 
commissions much differently than the lower courts.  In Rosenberg, 
the court acknowledged that because the agreement between 
Rosenberg and Heritage required that all sales close in order for 
commissions to be earned, Rosenberg did not earn his 
commissions at the time the purchase agreements were signed94 
and thus, Rosenberg had not “performed all that he undertook to 
perform” under the contract at the time of his termination.95  
Because of the absence of a contractual remedy, the supreme court 
looked to precedent involving the procuring cause doctrine.96  
Citing Spring Co., the court stated that “a broker has a right to a 
commission when the broker has been the procuring cause for the 
sale, even though the sale is completed after the listing agreement 
has terminated and the commission had not been earned prior to 
termination.”97  The court noted that this rule is based on the 
 
 90. Id. at *4 (citing Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm, 460 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1990)). 
 91. Id. at *4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 324. 
 94. The court noted that “[t]he July Agreement specifies that if a sale does 
not ultimately close, any advance given to Rosenberg for the purchase agreement 
would be refunded or applied to the next signed purchase agreement.”  Id. at 327. 
 95. Id. (citing Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 510, 253 N.W.2d 133, 141 
(1977)). 
 96. See id. at 327-28. 
 97. Id. at 327 (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 55, 78 N.W.2d 315, 
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principle that “no one can avail himself of the nonperformance of 
a condition precedent who has himself occasioned its 
nonperformance.”98  Applying these principles to the situation in 
Rosenberg, the court reasoned that because Heritage caused the 
nonperformance of the closings (the conditions precedent) 
required for Rosenberg to earn his commissions by abruptly 
terminating the listing agreement, it could not argue that 
Rosenberg should not receive commissions on those sales when 
they eventually closed.99  However, the court acknowledged the 
possibility that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 might abrogate the 
common law procuring cause doctrine.100  The court then 
examined that possibility. 
The court considered two interpretations regarding the effect 
of Statutes section 82.21.101  The first interpretation of the statute 
considered by the court involved the possibility that section 82.21 
provides a liberal “alternative remedy” to allow brokers to collect 
commissions even when they are not the procuring cause of the 
sale as defined by the common law.102  Under this view, the statute 
then acts as a limitation on this remedy by “requiring that the 
listing agreement include the precise terms, and that the broker 
take the precise actions, specified in [the statute].”103  The supreme 
court explained this interpretation by noting that the override 
remedy provided by the statute is much broader than the common 
law procuring cause remedy.104  The court contrasted the common 
law’s requirement that the broker’s work set into motion a 
continuous course of events leading to the eventual sale in order to 
earn a commission,105 with section 82.21’s override remedy, which 
demands only a sale to “any person who . . . contacted the broker 
or who showed an interest in the property during the term 
listing.”106  Additionally, the court agreed with this interpretation 
 
318 (1956)). 
 98. Id. (citing Olson v. Penkert, 252 Minn. 334, 343, 90 N.W.2d 193, 200 
(1958)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 328. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318 
(1956)). 
 106. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.195, subd. 5 (2002), currently MINN. STAT. § 
82.21, subd. 2(e) (2004)). 
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because, in the court’s view, section 82.21 does not specifically 
mandate the inclusion of an override clause in every listing 
contract, but rather “describes what such clauses must contain if 
they are included.”107 
The second reading of Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 
considered by the court suggested that the statue “so 
comprehensively addresses the subject of the effect of the 
termination of a listing agreement on a broker’s right to 
commissions that the statutory override remedy was intended to be 
exclusive.”108  The court noted support of this interpretation by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals in Lynn Beechler Realty,109 but went on to 
explain why this interpretation was incorrect. 
First, the court pointed to the fact that Minnesota Statutes 
section 82.21 contains no explicit language stating that the override 
remedy provided in the statute was meant to displace the procuring 
cause doctrine or any other common law remedies.110  The court 
noted that normally, when the legislature intends to supplant the 
common law through statute, it does so expressly.111 
Second, the court argued that “the legislature expressly 
disclaimed any intent to abrogate the common law” both at the time 
the statute was first enacted in 1993, and upon its amendment in 
1994.112  The court noted that in 1993, the “Scope and Effect” 
section of Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes stated: “The 
requirement for disclosure of agency relationships set forth in this 
chapter are intended only to establish a minimum standard for 
regulatory purposes, and are not intended to abrogate common law.”113  
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717, 720 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  The supreme court noted that the only reason given 
supporting the conclusion that Statute section 82.21 abrogated the procuring 
cause doctrine by the court in Lynn Beechler Realty was that the common law rule 
preceded the statute.  Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328. 
 110. Id. at 328-29. 
 111. Id. at 328.  In a footnote, the court cited Minnesota Statutes section 
176.031 as an example of this type of language.  Id. at 328 n.7.  The statute, which 
involves Minnesota Workers’ Compensation law, states that “[t]he liability of an 
employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability . . 
. .”  Id. (emphasis added).  The court also noted Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance statute, section 65B.51, subdivisions 1 and 3, which supplants the 
common law by providing that “no person shall recover damages for noneconomic 
detriment unless . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. (citing Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 309, § 9, 1993 Minn. Laws 1794, 1801 
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The court also noted that as amended in 1994, the statute 
maintained this intent through the language: “Disclosures made in 
accordance with the requirements for disclosure of agency 
relationships set forth in this chapter are sufficient to satisfy 
common law disclosure requirements.”114 
Third, the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to its historic 
reluctance to allow a statute to abrogate the common law when the 
intent is not expressed in the statute.115  The court stated, “Statutory 
enactments, even though they provide new procedures to enforce 
pre-existing rights at law and in equity, are to be read in harmony 
with the existing body of law, inclusive of existing equitable 
principles, unless an intention to change or repeal it is apparent.”116 
Finally, the court noted that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 
does not require an override clause in every listing agreement, but 
makes it optional by including the language “if applicable.”117  As a 
result, the supreme court concluded that genuine issues of material 
fact existed with regard to Rosenberg’s procuring cause claims and 
remanded for trial of those claims.118 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROSENBERG DECISION 
In Rosenberg, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the 
proposition that the use of an override clause under section 82.21 
was intended to provide a liberal alternative remedy to the 
procuring cause doctrine, while retaining the court’s authority to 
use the procuring cause remedy when equity requires.119  In light of 
the comprehensive coverage and mandatory nature of the statute, 
however, it is likely that section 82.21 was meant to abrogate the 
 
(alteration in original)). 
 114. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.197, subd. 3 (2002)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (citing Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 465, 68 N.W.2d 376, 382 
(1955)). 
 117. Id. at 330 (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.197, subd. 2(6)(2002), currently MINN. 
STAT. § 82.21, 2(b)(6)(2004)). 
 118. Id.  The court described the result in a Colorado case involving a similar 
statute: “A similar conclusion was reached by the Colorado Court of Appeals in 
Telluride Real Estate Co. v. Penthouse Affiliates, LLC, 996 P.2d 151, 154 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1999).  The court rejected the argument that a statute regulating the 
relationships between real estate brokers and sellers was intended to supplant 
existing common law, holding that the statute did not eliminate the common law 
procuring cause remedy.”  Id.  Justice Russell A. Anderson and Chief Justice 
Kathleen A. Blatz dissented.  Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 332-34. 
 119. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328; ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12. 
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common law procuring cause doctrine and provide an exclusive 
remedy for realtors to recover post-termination commissions. 
A. Flaws in the Supreme Court’s Analysis 
In order to facilitate its interpretation of Minnesota Statutes 
section 82.21, subdivision 2 in Rosenberg, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court relied little on the substance of the statute and focused 
instead on more generalized reasoning.  While there is merit to the 
court’s reliance on the principle that the legislature would have 
expressly provided for abrogation of the procuring cause doctrine 
if that was what it intended,120 the court provided little further 
persuasive reasoning regarding the effect of the statute. 
1. The Legislature’s Intent 
The court’s chief substantive argument in Rosenberg was that 
Chapter 82 lacks an affirmative statement of the legislature’s intent 
to supplant the procuring cause remedy.121  While that statement is 
true, the court incorrectly argued that the statute states the 
legislature’s intent not to supplant the common law through language 
in the Scope and Effect statement of section 82.22.122  To make its 
argument, the court relied on the clause, “sufficient to satisfy 
common law disclosure requirements” in section 82.22.123  
However, as Justice Russell A. Anderson correctly argued in his 
dissenting opinion, the court’s reasoning on this point is flawed 
because that clause is, by its location at the beginning of the section 
addressing agency disclosure requirements, intended only to apply 
to that portion of the statute.124  For the court’s argument to have 
the desired effect, a similar statement of scope and effect would 
have to be included before section 82.21, or better, at the head of 
the statute.  As a result, rather than proving that the Minnesota 
legislature expressly retained the procuring cause doctrine in section 
 
 120. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (“We have 
long followed the presumption that statutory law is consistent with common law . . 
. . If statutory enactment is to abrogate common law, the abrogation must be by 
express wording or necessary implication.”  Id. at 377-78.). 
 121. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328-29. 
 122. Specifically, the supreme court stated that “the initial version of section 
[82.22] expressly disclaimed any intent to abrogate the common law and the 
amended version expressly recognized that common law requirements continue to 
exist and are not replaced by the statute.”  Id. at 329. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. at 333-34 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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82.21, the court inadvertently made a strong argument advocating 
that section 82.22 retained Minnesota’s common law agency disclosure 
requirements.125  In addition, if the court’s reasoning is taken one 
step further, the legislature’s express statement of its desire not to 
abrogate one common law doctrine in one section of the statute 
leads to the conclusion that the legislature would have also 
expressly retained other common law rules in other sections, 
including the procuring cause remedy in section 82.21, if that is 
what it intended. 
2. The Mandatory Nature of the Statute 
In addition to the above errors in the court’s analysis, the 
court misinterpreted the comprehensive coverage of the statute 
and the mandatory nature of section 82.21’s override remedy as 
“permissive” when it stated that “[t]he statute does not require that 
an override clause be included in a listing agreement but treats it as 
optional—‘if applicable.’”126  This analysis by the court oversimplifies 
the requirements of the statute.  Very few of the rules governing 
real estate brokers and salespersons in chapter 82 are permissive.127  
Instead, the requirements of the statute are set out in mandatory 
language, using the terms “must” and “shall.”128  This mandatory 
language extends to actions for commissions, and also applies to 
listing agreements, override clauses, and protective lists.129 
To bring a civil action for commissions under Chapter 82, a 
broker must have a written agreement.130  Further, in the 
introductory language of section 82.21, subdivision 2, the statute 
 
 125. The agency disclosure requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 82.22 
require that a broker “provide to a consumer in the sale and purchase of a 
residential property transaction at the first substantive contact with the consumer 
an agency disclosure form” that substantially complies with the statutory 
requirements for disclosure forms, which are also set out in detail in the statute.  
MINN. STAT. § 82.22, subds. 2, 4 (2004). 
 126. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 330 (emphasis added). 
 127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(d)(2) (2004) (“A listing agreement 
may contain an override clause of up to two years in length when used in 
conjunction with the purchase or sale of a business.” (emphasis added)). 
 128. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 332-34 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  “There 
can be no disputing the fact that licensed real estate brokers are required to 
comply with the provisions of chapter 82.  The mandatory nature of [section 
82.21] is evidenced by the terms utilized by the legislature . . . .”  Id. at 332 n.1 
(Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 129. See MINN. STAT. §§ 82.18, 82.21 (2004). 
 130. Id. § 82.18, subd. 2 (2004). 
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requires: “Licensees shall obtain a signed listing agreement or other 
signed written authorization . . . before advertising to the general 
public that the real property is available for sale or lease.”131 
After the statute sets out that listing agreements are required, 
it delineates the necessary elements of those agreements: “All 
listing agreements must be in writing and must include [the 
required elements].”132  Section 82.21 requires various elements 
that must be included in a valid listing agreement.133  One of those 
elements is “information regarding an override clause, if 
applicable.”134  The Minnesota Supreme Court focused on the words 
“if applicable” in Rosenberg, holding that the words make inclusion 
of an override clause entirely optional.135  While that statement is 
generally true in that parties are not mandated by the statute to 
include an override clause in all situations,136 the choice to exclude 
the provision necessarily carries certain consequences regarding 
the receipt of commissions.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
interpretation eliminates these consequences. 
Under the court’s interpretation, the phrase “if applicable” in 
subdivision 2(b)(6) merely suggests that a listing agreement may 
include information regarding an override clause if the broker 
wants it to contain that information, and if not, the broker can fall 
back on the procuring cause doctrine to recover commissions.  
This is not the best interpretation, however.  Instead, that 
subdivision should be read as a mandate that a listing agreement 
must include information regarding an override clause if the broker 
wants to recover commissions after the expiration of the listing 
agreement.  This interpretation makes sense for two reasons. 
First, the statute’s definition of “override clause” implies this 
result.137  Section 82.17 of the statute defines an override clause as 
“a provision in a listing agreement . . . allowing the broker to receive 
compensation . . . after the listing agreement has expired.”138  This 
definition suggests that only an override clause will allow a broker 
 
 131. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(1)-(10). 
 134. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
 135. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 330. 
 136. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 23 (“The override clause is a 
matter of negotiation between seller and realtor . . . . If there is no ‘override 
clause,’ then the realtor has no contractual basis to obtain commissions for sales 
that close after the listing agreement ends.”). 
 137. See MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 12 (2004) (defining “override clause”). 
 138. Id. (emphasis added). 
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to receive post-termination commissions; without an override 
clause, recovery of those commissions is not allowed.  Second, 
section 82.21(b)(5) requires that all listing agreements include “a 
clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will entitle 
a broker to a commission . . . .”139  This requirement furthers the 
implication that a broker who intends to receive commissions after 
the expiration of the agreement must include an override clause as 
one of those “events.”140  As a result, read in the context of the 
mandatory “must” tone of section 82.21, the phrase “if applicable” 
should be interpreted to mean that “applicable” situations are 
those in which the broker will have the opportunity to receive post-
termination commissions.  Accordingly, situations in which this 
opportunity is not available, such as the case in Rosenberg, are “non-
applicable” situations.141 
3. Time Limits for Enforcement 
The court’s interpretation allowing use of the procuring cause 
remedy also negates the statute’s time restriction for obtaining 
post-termination commissions.142  As Justice Anderson noted in his 
dissent, subdivision 2(c) of section 82.21 prohibits the inclusion of 
 
 139. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(5). 
 140. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  In dissent, 
Justice Anderson stated: 
The common law principle relied upon by the majority is nowhere 
referenced in the listing agreement, which, according to statute, must 
contain "a clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will 
entitle a broker to a commission."  Minn.Stat. § 82.195, subd. 2(b)(5).  
When the legislature provides that events or conditions that will entitle a 
broker to a commission must be explained in a "clear statement" in the 
listing agreement, I would conclude that a common law claim, neither 
mentioned nor explained by a clear statement in a listing agreement, is 
barred. 
Id. 
 141. The mandatory nature of chapter 82 can also be seen in the legislative 
history involving the codification of the statute in 1993.  In a hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Commerce and Consumer Protection, a member of the 
Department of Commerce described the requirements as “a prohibition that you 
cannot maintain an action for commission[s] if you fail to get that particular 
listing agreement.”  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 30 n.3 (citing An Act 
Relating to Real Estate, 1993; Hearings on S.F. No. 1000 Before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce and Consumer Protection; April 7, 1993 (Statement of Dick Gomsrud, 
Department of Commerce)).  This statement provides additional support for the 
conclusion that a broker who fails to comply with the requirements of section 
82.21 should not be allowed to rely on alternative remedies outside of the statute. 
 142. See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(c) (2004). 
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“a holdover clause, automatic extension, or any similar provision, or 
an override clause the length of which is more than six months 
after the expiration of the listing agreement.”143  Presumably, the 
intended effect of this clause is to limit the length of time in which 
a broker can collect commissions after the termination of a listing 
agreement.  Applying the court’s interpretation, however, a broker 
could receive commissions under the procuring cause remedy, 
which contains no time restraint, far beyond the six-month limit.144  
This result contravenes this statutory provision. 
 
B. Consumers, Certainty, and Preventing Disputes 
 
1. Chapter 82 Protects Consumers 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ignored the overall intent of 
Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes in its interpretation in Rosenberg.  
In fact, the overall purpose of the statute is not even mentioned in 
the court’s opinion.145  Simply put, Chapter 82 of Minnesota 
Statutes was “enacted to protect the public from unqualified or 
unreliable real estate brokers.”146  This overarching goal of 
 
 143. Id. (emphasis added). 
 144. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  In dissent, 
Justice Anderson stated: 
The length of the override provision may not extend more than 6 
months beyond the expiration of the listing agreement and, with 
exception not applicable here, a broker "shall not" include in a listing 
agreement a holdover clause, automatic extension, "or any similar 
provision . . . ."  Minn.Stat. § 82.195, subd. 3 (2002).  The majority 
apparently believes that beneath these clear and comprehensive statutory 
requirements and prohibitions is a surviving common law equitable 
remedy which allows a broker to recover a commission when the broker 
is the procuring cause of a sale completed after termination of the listing 
agreement.  In my view, the majority has read into this listing agreement 
a "similar provision" to an override clause that the legislature has clearly 
prohibited. 
Id. 
 145. See id. at 320. 
 146. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 28 (quoting Albers v. Fitschen, 274 
Minn. 375, 37[6], 143 N.W.2d 841, 84[3] (1966)).  Compare MINN. STAT. § 82 
(2004) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-801 (2004).  The legislative declaration that 
proceeds Colorado’s statute governing real estate brokerage relationships states: 
The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that the public will 
best be served through a better understanding of the public's legal and 
working relationships with real estate brokers and by being able to 
engage any such real estate broker on terms and under conditions that 
the public and the real estate broker find acceptable.  This includes 
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providing concrete and specific requirements for real estate 
brokers can be seen in many aspects of the statute’s construction. 
Chapter 82 contains numerous provisions preventing brokers 
from engaging in actions which might prove detrimental to the 
general public.  First, and most importantly, the statute protects the 
public by requiring Minnesota real estate brokers to be licensed.147  
Minnesota Statutes section 82.18 states that no person can bring an 
action for compensation in a real estate transaction “without 
proving that the person was a duly licensed real estate broker . . . at 
the time the alleged cause of action arose.”148  The statute spells 
outs specific requirements for the licensure of real estate brokers 
including, for example, a required degree of difficulty for brokers 
examinations,149 a minimum of two years of “actual” experience in 
real estate,150 a score of seventy-five percent on both the uniform 
and state portions of the licensure examination,151 and various 
continuing education requirements.152  Second, the statute’s 
contract and listing agreement requirements, agency disclosure 
requirements, prohibitions, and standards of conduct are in place 
to ensure that brokers do not engage in activities that are 
potentially harmful to the public.153 
By interpreting section 82.21, subdivision 2 to allow recovery of 
commissions even when a broker does not comply with the 
requirements of the statute, the court does a disservice to the 
 
engaging a broker as a single agent or transaction-broker. Individual 
members of the public should not be exposed to liability for acts or omissions of real 
estate brokers that have not been approved, directed, or ratified by such 
individuals.  Further, the public should be advised of the general duties, 
obligations, and responsibilities of the real estate broker they engage. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-801 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 147. See MINN. STAT. § 82.18, subd. 1 (2004). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 82.29, subd. 4(a). 
 150. Id. § 82.29, subd. 4(b).  However, an applicant may request that the 
commissioner waive the actual experience requirement if the applicant can prove 
either ninety credits or 270 hours of real-estate related coursework, at least five 
consecutive years of “practical” real-state experience, or a combination of thirty 
credits or ninety classroom hours and three consecutive years of “practical” 
experience.  Id. § 82.29, subd. 5. 
 151. Id. § 82.29, subd. 6. 
 152. Id. § 82.32.  The continuing education requirements required by 
Minnesota Statutes section 82.32 mandate thirty hours of continuing education 
per year as a student or lecturer.  Id. 
 153. See Lynn Beechler Realty v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (“However, the Rules are specifically intended to protect 
homeowners.”). 
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public by exposing sellers to claims for unwarranted commissions 
by brokers who have simply failed to meet Minnesota’s statutory 
requirements.  As the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted in Realty 
House, “the application of this rule may seem harsh when a realtor 
has earned a commission, or when . . . there is misrepresentation or 
deception.  However, the policy considerations behind the Rules 
Relating to Real Estate support a strict application.”154  Although 
this public-oriented policy goal may not arise in the case of the 
sophisticated parties in Rosenberg, the implications of the case 
certainly have the potential to affect unsophisticated sellers in the 
future. 
2. Section 82.21 Promotes Certainty and Prevents Disputes 
In addition to effectuating the requirements of the statute 
intended to generally benefit the public, an interpretation of 
section 82.21, subdivision 2 as a broker’s exclusive remedy for post-
termination commission claims promotes certainty when disputes 
arise.  The proposition that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 
promotes certainty is well stated in a passage from Heritage 
Renovations’ brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court: 
The Rules [set out in section 82.21] are not at all difficult 
or onerous, but they serve the important goal of 
protecting sellers from overreaching realtors and 
providing for orderly sales of property where the rights of 
the seller and realtor are well defined.  The Rules create 
“bright line” guidance for realtors and sellers.  The Rules 
avoid confusion and should avoid disputes . . . If this 
Court accepted Appellant’s invitation to entirely disregard 
the Rules . . . the Court would inflict a great disservice on 
all realtors and sellers.  The “bright lines” would give way . 
. . to a case-by-case analysis of whether, through someone’s 
notion of “equity,” the realtor “deserves” a commission.155 
The function of the statute in creating a “bright line” rule is 
key to its effectiveness.  Real estate brokers are trained, licensed 
professionals who know, or should know, the applicable rules and 
standards of conduct.156  As such, brokers would not be unduly 
 
 154. Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm, 460 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 155. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 20. 
 156. See Realty House, 460 N.W.2d at 920.  In its brief to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, Heritage noted that “[a]ny real estate agent in Minnesota should be 
thoroughly familiar with [section 82.21] and its requirements.  It was apparent 
from his deposition, however, that despite his claimed twenty years experience as a 
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burdened by being strictly held to the state’s statutory 
requirements.  Without this firm enforcement, the statute is 
ineffective and provides only an unenforceable list of suggestions 
for real estate practitioners. 
The need for certainty in commission disputes is further 
illustrated by the nature of Rosenberg’s commission claims and the 
burden of analyzing those claims under the procuring cause 
doctrine.  On remand, Rosenberg will be required to present 
evidence that his efforts did more than merely contribute to the 
result of the eventual condominium sales for which he claims 
commissions.  Rosenberg will be required to show that his work was 
the “producing and effective” result of those sales.157  Because of 
the fact that almost half of the claimed commissions in Rosenberg 
are based on “reservation agreements” rather than purchase 
agreements, whether Rosenberg’s efforts produced these sales will 
be the subject of controversy between the parties.  This conflict is 
previewed in Heritage Renovations’ brief to the supreme court: 
There is no dispute that [Rosenberg] submitted these 
purchase agreements, but it is equally undisputed that 
Appellant did nothing to convert the reservation 
agreements to purchase agreements or to ensure that all 
contingencies were resolved, that option amendments 
were executed, that financing was obtained and that the 
myriad other necessary tasks were undertaken to facilitate 
the ultimate closing . . . after [Rosenberg] was terminated.  
The realty firm that replaced [Rosenberg] . . . provided 
the necessary realty services [after the agreement was 
terminated].158 
The time consuming case-by-case factual examination that will 
take place upon remand of Rosenberg’s procuring cause claims is 
precisely the type of inefficiency that was meant to be prevented 
through the listing agreement requirements in Minnesota Statutes 
Section 82.21.  If Rosenberg had merely complied with the statute’s 
override clause provisions, he would only be required to show that 
he carried out the activities designated in the clause.159  Under 
subdivision 2(e) of section 82.21, these activities could be as simple 
as proving that a potential buyer made a “showing of interest in the 
 
realtor, [Rosenberg] did not even know what an override clause was.”  
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 22. 
 157. Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1956). 
 158. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 14. 
 159. See Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011. 
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property” or was “physically shown the property.”160  Requiring the 
use of an override clause for a broker to receive post-termination 
commissions encourages the parties to a transaction to consciously 
negotiate their rights under their agreement, thus preventing 
lengthy litigation when disagreements arise.161  Under the court’s 
analysis in Rosenberg, however, parties are allowed to wait until a 
dispute arises and force a court to determine the broker’s rights. 
Before Rosenberg, Minnesota Courts correctly applied 
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2.162  In Lynn Beechler 
Realty, Douglass, and Realty House, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
properly applied Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 as 
a set of mandatory requirements that abrogate the common law 
and prevent inefficient case-by-case analysis.163  Without this 
certainty, both realtors and sellers of real estate are left to guess 
whether they will be protected by the terms that they negotiated 
under state law, or surprised by claims that they could not 
anticipate.164  This could not be the result that the statute was 
meant to promote. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By refusing to allow Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 to 
abrogate the common law procuring cause remedy in Rosenberg, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reopened the door for litigation of 
numerous commission disputes in which brokers fail to include 
override clauses or provide protective lists.  Because the court, 
through its reliance on lack of express legislative intent to replace 
the common law in Chapter 82, refused to interpret section 82.21’s 
override remedy as an exclusive remedy that overrides the 
procuring cause doctrine, the legislature must step in and clarify 
the statute. 
To remedy the effects of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Rosenberg, the Minnesota legislature should amend 
Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 to include an express 
statement of its intent to override the common law procuring cause 
doctrine.  In addition, the phrase “if applicable” in section 2(b)(6) 
should be removed and replaced with language clarifying that 
 
 160. See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(e) (2004). 
 161. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 20. 
 162. See supra Part II.D. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
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commissions on sales procured, but not consummated before the 
end of a listing agreement cannot be enforced if an override clause 
is not provided.  With these changes to the statute, Minnesota 
courts can return to their enforcement of the listing agreement 
requirements in section 82.21 as an abrogation of the common law 
procuring cause doctrine. 
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